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Abstract: 
How much knowledge is there in an economy? In recent years, data on the mix of 
products that countries export has been used to construct measures of economic complexity that 
estimate the knowledge available in an economy and predict future economic growth. Here we 
introduce a new and simpler metric of economic complexity (ECI+) that measures the total 
exports of an economy corrected by how difficult it is to export each product. We use data from 
1973 to 2013 to compare the ability of ECI+, the Economic Complexity Index (ECI), and Fitness 
complexity, to predict future economic growth using 5, 10, and 20-year panels in a pooled OLS, 
a random effects model, and a fixed effects model. We find that ECI+ outperforms ECI and 
Fitness in its ability to predict economic growth and in the consistency of its estimators across 
most econometric specifications. On average, one standard deviation increase in ECI+ is 
associated with an increase in annualized growth of about 4% to 5%. We then combine ECI+ 
with measures of physical capital, human capital, and institutions, to find a robust model of 
economic growth. The ability of ECI+ to predict growth, and the value of its coefficient, is 
robust to these controls. Also, we find that human capital, political stability, and control of 
corruption; are positively associated with future economic growth, and that initial income is 
negatively associated with growth, in agreement with the traditional growth literature. Finally, 
we use ECI+ to generate economic growth predictions for the next 20 years and compare these 
predictions with the ones obtained using ECI and Fitness. These findings improve the methods 
available to estimate the knowledge intensity of economies and predict future economic growth.  
KEYWORDS: Economic Complexity, Knowledge Intensity, Economic Growth, 
International Development 
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Introduction 
For decades, the theory and empirics of economic growth has attempted to understand 
why some economies grow faster than others. The early literature focused on the accumulation 
of simple productive factors such as labor and physical capital 1. But soon enough, the literature 
turned into more nuanced factors, such as human capital 2,3, institutions 4,5, social capital 6–8, and 
technological change 9,10. Yet, even when taken together, these factors have been unable to fully 
explain economic growth. As a result, economic growth still poses questions, embodied in the 
idea of Total Factor Productivity (TFP), a measure of the output of an economy that is not 
explained by the availability of factors. That is, a measure of how much output an economy can 
produce per unit of input.  
In the last decade, the search to understand TFP gave rise to a new literature on economic 
complexity 11–21, which does not aim to identify individual factors, but to measure combinations 
of them indirectly. The assumption is that, if growth depends on having combinations of factors, 
and on the ability to use them productively, then, it should be possible to measure the 
combinations of factors that predict growth—whatever these may be—by looking at the 
expression of these factors in the diversity and sophistication of the products that countries 
produce and export.  
Consider exporting fresh fish. Fresh fish is a product that requires specific physical 
capital inputs, such as a reliable power grid and cold storage, but also, that requires specific 
institutional factors, such as navigating international phytosanitary standards. Producing and 
exporting fresh fish, however, also requires specific knowledge on aquiculture and on the global 
fish market. This means that an observation as simple as seeing a country export fresh fish can 
tell us about the presence of specific technological, human, and institutional factors, in an 
economy. 
Measures of economic complexity have been validated by studying their ability to predict 
future economic growth. Economic complexity is highly predictive of future economic growth 
once we control for a country’s initial level of income 11,22, and this observation is robust to 
controlling for a large number of factors, from human capital factors, to measures of 
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competitiveness and institutions 22. That is, countries with an income that is below what we 
expect based on its productive structure grow faster than those with an income that is too high. 
Moreover, recent work has also shown that countries with relatively high levels of economic 
complexity tend to have lower levels of income inequality, even after controlling for measures of 
education, income, and institutions 14.  
The ability of economic complexity to predict growth supports well-established ideas in 
economics, such as the idea that institutions, education, knowledge, know-how, and technology, 
are required for economic growth. What these measures of complexity do differently, however, 
is that they avoid the need to define these factors or their importance a-priori. Instead, the 
measures are based on techniques that help define the knowledge intensity of economies and of 
activities endogenously from the data. These endogenous definitions rely on simple linear 
algebra techniques. For instance, the original economic complexity index (ECI) 11 defines the 
complexity of an economy as the average complexity of its products, and the complexity of a 
product as the average complexity of the countries exporting it. This circular argument is in fact 
mathematically tractable using linear algebra and has a solution in the form of an eigenvector, 
allowing the creation of an endogenous definition of the complexity, or knowledge intensity, of 
an economy.  
This technical innovation helped separate these measures of economic complexity from 
other measures relying on exogenous definitions of knowledge intense activities (efforts, for 
instance, that define some sectors—e.g. services, or software—as knowledge intense, and then 
measure knowledge intensity as the fraction of people employed in these sectors). This 
innovation also helped these measures become adopted in other domains; for instance, they have 
been used to estimate the innovative capacity of cities using patent data 23. 
Yet, these measures of complexity are not free of limitations. One limitation of the 
economic complexity index is that it requires defining which countries export which products, a 
task that is not easy to do in a world where the markets for products and the sizes of economies 
vary by multiple orders of magnitude. The convention has been to consider as exports only the 
products that a country has a revealed comparative advantage in 24. Yet, this definition introduces 
a hard threshold that introduces noise around the boundary. The metric of economic complexity 
we introduce here (ECI+), avoids this limitation by using a continuous definition. ECI+ defines 
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the complexity of an economy as the total exports of a country corrected by how difficult it is to 
export each product and by the size of that country’s export economy.  
To get the intuition behind ECI+, compare the exports of large aircrafts to that of men’s 
trousers. Large aircraft (unladen weight > 15,000 [kgs]) was the 8th most traded product in 2015 
(out of 4,857 products, with USD 157B in total exports)1, but only three countries (U.S. (37%), 
France (29%), and Germany (20%)) accounted for more than 86% of total large aircraft exports. 
Men’s trousers, on the other hand, were the 84th most traded product (out of 4,857 products, with 
USD 24.9B in total exports)2, but were exported by many countries, including China (22%), 
Bangladesh (20%), Mexico (5.5%), Pakistan (5.3%), Turkey (5.3%), Germany (3.9%), Italy 
(3.5%), Vietnam (3.1%), and Tunisia (2.7%). This suggests that exporting one dollar of large 
aircrafts is, on average, harder than exporting one dollar of trousers; because despite its large 
export volume, is rare for large aircrafts to represent a substantial fraction of a country’s export 
basket. In this paper, we mathematically formalize this intuition to create an improved measure 
of economic complexity that estimates the total exports of a country corrected by how difficult it 
is to export each product and by the size of its export economy.  
But, how do we know if we have a good measure of economic complexity? If the goal of 
a metric of economic complexity is to predict the income generating potential of an economy, 
then the best measures of economic complexity should be the one that is best at predicting long-
term future economic growth. Here, we use this pragmatic criterion to compare our new measure 
of economic complexity (ECI+) with the original Economic Complexity Index (ECI) 11, and the 
Fitness Complexity Index 17. We find that ECI+ outperforms both the original Economic 
Complexity Index and the Fitness Complexity Index at both short and long-time scales, showing 
that it is the best measure of economic complexity available. Moreover, we find that ECI+ 
provides consistent estimators for a wide variety of econometric specifications (OLS, Random 
Effects, and Fixed Effects models), whereas Fitness Complexity provides inconsistent estimators 
and is not always significant. Finally, we use our results to predict the average expected 
annualized growth rates for the next 20 years. These results improve the metrics available to 
estimate the sophistication of an economy using exports data.  
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Data  
We use international trade data from MIT’s Observatory of Economic Complexity 
(atlas.media.mit.edu/about/data25). We choose the SITC-4 rev 2 dataset, which provides the 
longest time series; 1962 to 2014. The dataset captures trade information for 250 countries and 
986 products. For the shorter time series, we use the HS92 (4-digit level) BACI dataset, which 
provides more detailed and precise export data for 226 countries/regions and 1241 products from 
1995-2015. To reduce noise, we filter the data by removing city-sized national economies, or 
economies for which no reliable data was available. That is, we focus on countries with a 
population of more than 1.25 million in 2008 and exports of more than 1 billion in that year. We 
also exclude Chad (TCD), Iraq (IRQ), and Afghanistan (AFG). Moreover, we run four time 
dependent filters. For each year, we exclude products when the dollar value of exports is equal to 
zero for more than 80% of the countries. In 2010, those products are only ‘Copra’, ‘Manila 
Hemp’, and ‘Uranium and Thorium’. We also exclude a country if it’s dollar value equals zero 
for 95% of the products (in 2010 no country would have been excluded). We also exclude a 
product if global exports are less than 10 million and round to zero any country-product 
combination that involves less than USD 5,000 in exports. After these filters, our final sample 
(see SM) for 2010, consists of 121 countries who add to 96.75% of global GDP and 83.37% of 
global trade. 
We use GDP, population, human capital, number of workers, and capital data from the 
Penn World Tables (PWT 9.0). GDP data is real GDP National Accounts, which measures GDP 
in constant USD in 2005 26. We use measures of institutions including rule of law, voice and 
accountability, control of corruption, regulatory quality, government effectiveness, political 
stability, and absence of violence/terrorism, from the World Bank Governance Indicators (2011).   
Methods 
Here we describe the methods used to calculate past metrics of economic complexity 
(ECI and Fitness), and also, describe the method we introduce to calculate ECI+. We estimate all 
metrics using the same exact data. In all cases, we let Xcp be a matrix summarizing the dollar 
exports of country c in product p.  
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To estimate the original Economic Complexity Index (ECI), and Fitness Complexity (F), 
we first need to define a matrix of revealed comparative advantage (Rcp). This matrix tells us 
which countries are significant exporters of which products. Rcp connects countries to the 
products they export more than what we expect based on a country’s total exports and a 
product’s global market.  
Formally, we define: 
 
𝑅𝑐𝑝 =
𝑋𝑐𝑝
𝐸(𝑋𝑐𝑝)
⁄   (1) 
where 𝐸(𝑋𝑐𝑝) = (∑ 𝑋𝑐𝑝𝑐 ∑ 𝑋𝑐𝑝𝑝 ) ∑ 𝑋𝑐𝑝𝑐𝑝⁄  is the expected exports of country c in product p. 
This is equal to the size of a country’s export economy (∑ 𝑋𝑐𝑝𝑐 ) times the size of that product’s 
global market (∑ 𝑋𝑐𝑝𝑝 ) divided by total world trade (∑ 𝑋𝑐𝑝𝑐𝑝 ).  
Then, we define Mcp=1 if a country has Rcp≥1 in a product and Mcp=0 otherwise. Mcp 
contains information about a country’s significant exports. Using Mcp we define the diversity of a 
country (𝑘𝑐 = ∑ 𝑀𝑐𝑝𝑝 ), as the number of products that it exports with revealed comparative 
advantage (Rcp≥1), and the ubiquity of a product (𝑘𝑝 = ∑ 𝑀𝑐𝑝𝑐 ), as the number of countries that 
export that product with revealed comparative advantage (Rcp≥1). 
Using the following definitions, the economic complexity index (ECI) and the product 
complexity index (PCI) are defined by assuming that the complexity of an economy is the 
average complexity of the products it exports, and the complexity of a product is the average 
complexity of the countries exporting it. This circular argument gives rise to the following 
iterative mapping: 
Putting (3) into (2) provides an eigenvalue equation whose solution is a country’s 
economic complexity index.  
 
𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑐 =
1
𝑘𝑐
∑ 𝑀𝑐𝑝𝑃𝐶𝐼𝑝
𝑝
  (2) 
 
𝑃𝐶𝐼𝑝 =
1
𝑘𝑝
∑ 𝑀𝑐𝑝𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑐
𝑐
  (3) 
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𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑐 = ∑
𝑀𝑐𝑝
𝑘𝑝𝑘𝑐
∑ 𝑀𝑐′𝑝𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑐′
𝑐′𝑝
 (4) 
The solution for the product complexity index can be obtained by using (4) on (3).  
Similarly, the Fitness Complexity index of a country (Fc) and of a product (Qp) are 
defined using a modified version of equations (2) and (3). The Fitness and the associated product 
complexity are defined as the steady state of the mapping: 
 ?̃?𝑐,𝑁 = ∑ 𝑀𝑐𝑝𝑄𝑝,𝑁−1
𝑝
 
 (4) 
 
?̃?𝑝,𝑁 =
1
∑ 𝑀𝑐𝑝
1
𝐹𝑐,𝑁−1𝑐
 
 (5) 
normalized by its mean after each step: 
 
𝐹𝑐,𝑁 =
?̃?𝑐,𝑁
1
{𝐶}
 ∑ ?̃?𝑐,𝑁𝑐
 
(6) 
 
𝑄𝑝,𝑁 =
?̃?𝑝,𝑁
1
{𝑃}
 ∑ ?̃?𝑝,𝑁𝑝
 
(7) 
where {C} and {P} are the number of countries and the number of products in the sample 
respectively, and the initial conditions are ?̃?𝑐,𝑜 = 1∀𝑐 and ?̃?𝑝,𝑜 = 1 ∀𝑝. 
Next, we present the formula for ECI+. the metric of economic complexity we introduce 
in this paper. ECI+ measures the total exports of an economy corrected by how difficult it is to 
export each product. The intuition is that fewer countries will be able to export products that are 
more knowledge intensive, even when these products have large markets. So, we correct the 
dollar export of each product by how “difficult” it is to export it. To calculate this corrected 
measure of exports we let 𝑋𝑐
0 = ∑ 𝑋𝑐𝑝𝑝  be the total exports of a country. Also, we let 1/ ∑
𝑋𝑐𝑝
𝑋𝑐
0𝑐  
(one over the average share that a product represents in the average country) be a measure of 
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how difficult it is to export a product. This simply assumes that products that are hard to export 
will represent a small share of exports for most countries (even when their export volumes are 
large).  Then, we can define the corrected total exports of a country as: 
 
𝑋𝑐
1 =  ∑
𝑋𝑐𝑝
∑
𝑋𝑐𝑝
𝑋𝑐
0𝑐𝑝
 
(8) 
 𝑋𝑐
1 is a measure of the total exports of a country corrected by how difficult it is to export 
each product. Yet, we can take this corrected value of total exports to calculate again the share 
that a product represents of the average country (𝑋𝑐
1 → 𝑋𝑐
2). This provides us with a second order 
correction: 
 
𝑋𝑐
2 =  ∑
𝑋𝑐𝑝
∑
𝑋𝑐𝑝
𝑋𝑐1
𝑐𝑝
 
(9) 
Taking this intuition to the limit gives us the iterative map: 
 
𝑋𝑐
𝑁 =  ∑
𝑋𝑐𝑝
∑
𝑋𝑐𝑝
𝑋𝑐𝑁−1
𝑐𝑝
 
(10) 
Using this definition we estimate ECI+ as the total exports of a country corrected by how 
difficult it is to export each product, minus the average share that the country represents in the 
export of a product (which accounts for the size of a country’s export economy).  
 
𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑐
+  = log(𝑋𝑐
∞) − log (∑
𝑋𝑐𝑝
𝑋𝑝
𝑝
) 
(11) 
To guarantee the numerical convergence of the mapping we normalize Xc at each step 
(including 𝑋𝑐
0) by its geometric mean: 
 𝑋𝑐
𝑁 =
𝑋𝑐
𝑁
(∏ 𝑋
𝑐′
𝑁
𝑐′ )
1
{𝐶}
  (12) 
where {C} is the number of countries in the sample. 
Similarly, we define the new product complexity index, PCI+, as the iterations of the 
mapping: 
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𝑋𝑝
𝑁 =  ∑
𝑋𝑐𝑝
∑
𝑋𝑐𝑝
𝑋𝑝𝑁−1
𝑝𝑐
 
(13) 
 
with the initial condition 𝑋𝑝
0 being the average share of a product in a country:  
 
𝑋𝑝
0 =  ∑
𝑋𝑐𝑝
𝑋𝑐
0
𝑐
 
 
(14) 
and also, normalizing at each step (including 𝑋𝑝
0) by its geometric mean: 
 
𝑋𝑝
𝑁 =
𝑋𝑝
𝑁
(∏ 𝑋
𝑝′
𝑁
𝑝′ )
1
{𝑃}
  
(15) 
where {P} is the number of products in the sample. Thus, we define 𝑃𝐶𝐼𝑝
+ as: 
 𝑃𝐶𝐼𝑝
+  = log(𝑋𝑝) − log (𝑋𝑝
∞) (16) 
where Xp is the total world trade in a product.  
ECI+ and PCI+ are, respectively, a measure of the total exports of a country, corrected by 
how difficult it is to export each product, and a measure of the total trade in a product, corrected 
by how easy it is to export that product. Unlike ECI and Fitness, ECI+ has the advantage of not 
requiring us to discretize the data (as in Mcp), since it is a function only of export values (Xcp).   
 
Results 
We begin by graphically comparing ECI+, with the original Economic Complexity Index 
(ECI), and Fitness Complexity (F). Then we introduce three econometric models to test the 
ability of each of these variables to predict future economic growth after controlling for measures 
of physical capital, human capital, and institutions (OLS, Random Effects, and Fixed Effects). 
We finalize the results section by looking at the income on future economic growth. 
Figure 1 a-c compares the three metrics graphically using a scatter plot for all countries. 
As expected, the metrics are positively correlated but have important deviations among them. 
ECI+ and ECI have a strong correlation (R2=85%), but ECI+ tends to rank manufacturing heavy 
countries higher than ECI (ECI+ ranks Vietnam higher than Qatar and China higher than 
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Norway). On the other hand, the correlation between Fitness, and both, ECI and ECI+, is much 
lower (respectively 48% and 43%). Fitness Complexity ranks many Southern European countries 
(such as Spain, Italy, and Portugal) at the top of the ranking, and also, provides very low 
complexity values for advanced East Asian and European economics, such as South Korea, 
Switzerland, Finland, Japan, and Singapore.  
Next, we compare the three complexity measures with GDP per capita (Figure 1 d-f). As 
expected, all metrics show a positive correlation with income. Yet, Fitness Complexity has a 
relatively weak correlation with income levels compared to both ECI+ and ECI.  
Figure 1 g-i tries to unpack the difference between these three metrics by comparing them 
with a pure measure of diversity (number of products a country exports with Rcp>1). Unlike 
ECI+ and ECI, Fitness Complexity tracks the raw diversity of countries closely, suggesting that 
it is not sensitive to differences in the sophistication of products and does not provide much 
additional information than using a simple measure of diversity. This explains why, for the 
Fitness measure, the economy of Greece is ranked higher than that of Japan, Sweden, or China. 
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Figure 1 Comparison of the three measures of economic complexity (ECI+, ECI, and F) using 2010 data. (a-c) Correlation 
between each pair of measures: a ECI and ECI+, b F and ECI+, and c F and ECI. (d-f) Correlation between each of the three 
measures with GDP per capita. (g-i) Correlation between each of the three measures with a pure measure of diversity (number of 
products a country exports with Rcp>1). 
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Next, we compare the ability of these three measures to predict future economic growth 
using the most consistent country set and data we have available (1973 – 2013) (see SM for 
details).  We start with a basic 40-year cross section model, and then specify 5, 10, and 20 year 
average periods using pooled OLS, random effects, and fixed effects models. The pooled OLS 
model provides a baseline, but suffers from omitted variable bias. Random effects models allow 
us to breakdown the variance into that explained by between and within country variation. Fixed 
effects regressions help us account for some of the omitted variable bias due to time or individual 
consistent effects and to relax the assumption that the country specific effects are uncorrelated 
with our explanatory factors (which is problematic for Random Effects models). 
In addition to the long run dataset, we use the three models with five-year panels from 
1998 – 2014 to include data from the World Bank Governance Indicators (which is only 
available for this period). For these specifications, we use exports data from the BACI dataset 
compiled by CEPII 27. This exports data starts in 1996 and is aggregated according to the HS4 
classification.  
We start by comparing the performance of these three metrics for the entire period for 
which data is available. Table 1 uses a cross sectional OLS regression to predict annualized 
growth from 1973 – 2013. Our variables of interest are ECI+, ECI, and Fitness, holding constant 
initial levels of income, human capital, capital per worker, and population. The regressions 
provide a broad picture of long-term economic growth. Though we can’t rely on the OLS for the 
coefficient estimates, we still find that ECI+ and ECI, along with their interaction terms with 
GDP per capita, are significant at the 1% level while Fitness (F) is not significant at any of the 
conventional levels. As expected, we also find that initial income is negatively correlated with 
growth in all three regressions and that human capital is positive and significant. From our 
variables of interest, ECI+ explains most of the variance in growth, although it is only marginally 
better than ECI. Fitness is a far third. In fact, ECI+ and ECI explain more than 8 percentage 
points of variance more than F.  
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Table 1 Linear regression model to predict economic growth using each of the three measures of economic complexity. 
 
Next, we present the results of predictions for 5, 10 and 20-year intervals, using OLS 
panels, random effects, and fixed effect models (Table 2-Table 4). These intervals help smooth 
over fluctuations in growth rates that may occur from a variety of shocks, such as natural 
disasters or natural resource price volatility. We balance our panel data set and only include 
countries for which we have information for the entire 1973–2013 period. This is to ensure that 
countries that drop in and out of the data are not driving our estimates.  
We compare estimates of complexity measures with pooled OLS, random effects, and 
fixed effects regressions using the base model: 
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𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑗 = 𝛽1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡−5+𝛽2𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−5 + 𝛽3𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−5𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−5+𝐶′𝑗,𝑡−5 + 𝛿𝐷𝑡 + 𝜐𝑖,𝑡  
 
Where Growthj is the compound annualized growth rate for country j during the period 
observed (CAGR). GDP is the initial GDP per capita of country j at the beginning of the period 
(time t minus 5 years in this example, but 10 or 20 years in other regressions), and ECI stands for 
ECI+, ECI, or Fitness, depending on the model. C is a vector of control variables that include 
initial population levels, initial human capital, and initial capital per worker. Dt are dummy 
variables for the respective year to control for any time effects on growth, such as a global 
economic recession. The error term is 𝜐𝑖,𝑡, in the case of the random effects model, this includes 
the individual effect coefficients, as well. Our model includes an interaction term between GDP 
per capita and complexity because this term helps test whether the effect of complexity on 
growth is more important for lower or higher income countries, and also, because this term has 
been shown to be a significant predictor in previous studies.22  
We present the results of the OLS, random effects, and fixed effects models for the 5, 10, 
and 20-year intervals in Table 2-Table 4. There are several features that are common to all 
specifications. First, we note that the coefficients for ECI+ and its interaction with income are 
consistent and statistically significant across all specifications. The coefficients of ECI behave 
similarly, with the exception of the five-year fixed effect model, where the coefficient preserves 
its positive sign but is not statistically significant.  The coefficients for Fitness, however, are 
inconsistent and not significant in the fixed effect models (and even reverse signs). Second, we 
find in the pooled OLS that the adjusted-R2 of ECI+ is always larger than that of ECI and 
Fitness. Third, the random effects model reveals that most of the variation is between countries. 
Moreover, we find that the coefficient for initial human capital is generally positive and 
significant and that of initial income is generally negative and significant.   
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Table 2 OLS, Random Effects, and Fixed Effects 5-year intervals linear growth regression models. 
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Table 3 OLS, Random Effects, and Fixed Effects 10-year intervals linear growth regression models. 
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Table 4 OLS, Random Effects, and Fixed Effects 20-year intervals linear growth regression models. 
 
Next, we control for institutions by adding data from the World Bank’s Governance 
Indicators in five-year panels. Table 5 repeats the OLS, random effects, and fixed effects models 
using 5-year panels. We observe that the coefficients of ECI+ are consistent across the three 
models after we control for institutions. The effects of initial income per capita and human 
capital are also unchanged. Among the institutional variables regulatory quality is consistently 
negative and significant, political stability and control of corruption are positive and significant, 
government effectiveness is consistently positive but not significant, and initial law and voice 
and accountability are inconsistent.  
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Table 5 Growth regression controlling for institutions. 
 
Finally, we use our twenty-year OLS model (Table 4, Columns 1, 4, and 7) to provide 
predictions of annualized future economic growth for the period between 2013 and 2033. Figure 
2 shows maps for the predictions obtained for ECI+, ECI, and F. We note that the OLS 
predictions have a strong regression to the mean, so the actual values should not be as 
informative as the relative rankings. Nevertheless, the maps still show some interesting patterns. 
All maps coincide in the continued growth of China, India, Philippines, and much of Eastern 
Europe. Yet, ECI+ is more optimistic than the other two predictors in the future economic 
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growth of Peru, Mexico, and Mongolia, and less optimistic in the growth of East African 
economies (for complete table see Appendix).  
 
Figure 2 Maps showing the predictions of annualized future economic growth for the period between 2013 and 2033 
for ECI+, ECI, and F. 
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Discussion 
Understanding economic growth is one of the central questions of development 
economics. In recent years, measures of economic complexity designed to capture the knowledge 
intensity of economies, have become important indicators of an economy’s future economic 
growth potential. Here we provide a methodological contribution by developing an improved 
metric of economic complexity that is better at predicting future economic growth than 
previously proposed measures. The metric is based on a method that corrects the exports of a 
country by considering how difficult it is to export each product. OLS, random effects, and fixed 
effects models show that this measure is better at predicting long-term growth than the 
previously proposed measures and has very consistent values for the estimators across all 
specifications.  
 Yet, economic complexity is not the only factor that helps predict future economic 
growth. At the margin of Economic Complexity, human capital has a mostly consistent positive 
effect, and income has a consistently negative effect in agreement with the traditional economic 
growth literature. When it comes to institutions, we find the effects of political stability and 
control of corruption to be mostly positive and significant, while those of regulatory quality tend 
to be negative and significant.  
This paper contributes to the growing literature on economic complexity by advancing an 
improved metric to estimate the total knowledge content of an economy and its income 
generating capacity. 
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